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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
1:-L\LT LAI{E CITY, a municipal ~ 
corporation of the State of Utah, 
and J. BRACKEN LEE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
THE METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, a corporation, and 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 
9617 
Brief of Defendant and Respondent 
The Metropolitan Water District 
of Salt Lake City 
Hereinafter appellant Salt Lake City will be re-
ferred to as the City, the respondent The Metropolitan 
\Vater District of Salt Lake City as the District, and Salt 
Lake County as the County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' statement of facts consists of erroneous 
statements and interpretations of the evidence together 
with arguments and conclusions of law with which we 
cannot agree. We therefore modify it as stated below. 
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On August 7, 1961 the Board of Directors of the Dis-
trict acting pursuant to Section 73-8-36 determined by 
resolution that the amount of money necessary to be 
raised by taxation during the fiscal year beginning the 
1st day of January, 1961, and ending the 31st day of De-
cember, 1961, for all District purposes is the sum of 
$639,690.00 and levied a tax against all of the taxable 
property in the District at a rate of 25c upon each $100.00 
of the assessed valuation of that property. The resolu-
tion in accord with the provisions of Section 73-8-37 di-
rected that in lieu of the tax levied the City could pay 
on or before August 27, 1961, the sum of $639,690.00 
(R. 8). On August 10, the City notified the District that 
it did not elect to pay the sum stated in lieu of the tax 
(Ex. 2). 
At the time the tax was levied, the District had on 
hand United States Government securities worth in ex-
cess of two million dollars, which were convertible into 
cash at anytime (Ex. 3, R. 50). It is these securities that 
are characterized by the plaintiffs as a cash surplus. 
The financial statement and supplemental schedules 
(Ex. 3) prepared by the accountants also indicated that 
on December 31, 1960, the District had on hand cash in 
the sum of $640,437.35. The evidence revealed, however, 
that the two million dollars in securities had been allo-
cated to a number of projects designed to obtain new 
supplies of water and to avert a shortage due to existing 
and anticipated drouth conditions. The cash on hand 
December 30, 1960, had been used by the District to pay 
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3 
fixed obligations, before the August, 1961 tax was levied 
(Ex. 6). 
The two million dollar investment is a fund reserved 
by the District to meet emergencies that arise in the 
course of performance of the functions for which the Dis-
trict wa.s created (Ex. 6). It was accumulated over a 
period of years out of profits which the District derived 
from the sale of water other than that sold to and con-
sumed within the City (R. 47). It had been resorted to 
from time to time in the past to meet such emergencies 
(R. 47). 
In determining the amount of money necessary to be 
raised by taxation during the year 1961, the Board took 
into consideration a number of circumstances. In the 
first place there was a pressing necessity to increase the 
delivery capacity of the Deer Creek Aqueduct. The grav-
ity flow rate of 155 c. f. s. had been demonstrated to be 
insufficient during the peak demands of the hot summer 
months. If the aqueduct could be converted from grav-
ity to pressure flow, the delivery rate could be greatly 
increased. To determine whether this conversion was 
feasible, it was necessary to make pressure tests and 
hydraulic studies. The estimated cost of the conversion 
was between three and five hundred thousand dollars. 
Ten Thousand Dollars was appropriated to make the 
tests and studies necessary to determine the feasibility 
of the project. The Board plans to complete this project, 
if feasible, by resorting to the reserve fund, instead of 
levying a special tax (Ex. 1). 
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The existing water storage facilities of the District 
and the City are inadequate to meet the demands of the 
rapidly increasing urban population (R. 34). An addition-
al reservoir is needed, not only to meet the ordinary peak 
water demands, but also to assure an adequate supply 
for fire protection and preservation of public health 
(Ex. 1). The District owns fifty acres of land on Wasatch 
Boulevard which it acquired in 194 7 in anticipation of the 
necessity for such reservoir (R. 40-41). Preliminary tests 
and engineering studies had to be made to determine the 
costs and conflicts which might arise out of the estab-
lishment of the highway known as the Belt Route. It was 
expected that the cost of the reservoir would exceed a 
million two hundred fifty thousand dollars, and again the 
Board planned to meet this cost from accumulated funds 
without levying a special tax against the property within 
the District (Ex. 1). 
At the time the resolution was passed, drouth con-
ditions had become acute and if they continued according 
to the usual pattern, a critical shortage of water was cer-
tain to occur in the very near future (Ex. 1, p. 5 and 6). 
The District had explored a number of possibilities of 
averting this crisis (Ex. 1, p. 6). Negotiations had been 
underway to purchase water from farmers, upon the basis 
of the value of crops lost (Ex. 1, p. 6). Four hundred 
thousand dollars out of the reserve fund was earmarked 
to purchase this water (Ex. 6, p. 6). 
Additional supplies of water could also be obtained 
by drilling deep wells. Two hundred thousand dollars 
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out of the reserve fund was allocated to the drilling and 
equipping of four deep wells (Ex. 6, p. 6). 
Sometime ago, the City had made application to 
appropriate the spring run-off in Little Cottonwood 
Creek. It could not complete its application, because of 
financial inability to construct the necessary diverting 
and storage facilities. It transferred its application to 
the District under an agreement whereby the latter would 
undertake to furnish these facilities (R. 62). The :first 
of these diverting works required was the construction 
of a reservoir, and a site known as Dimple Dell was 
under survey by the District. Extensive core drilling 
had to be done to determine the suitability of this site 
and an appropriation of $30,000 out of the reserve fund 
was made to do this work (Ex. 1). 
These proposed expenditures to meet the emergen-
cies confronting the District together with the cost of 
pressurizing the aqueduct and constructing the Wasatch 
reservoir would have exhausted the reserve fund. The 
District, of course, had to meet its :fixed obligations and 
pay its operating expenses. If all of the projected expend-
itures had been made, the reserve fund and all income 
including the 1961 tax would have been used up and the 
District would have only an estimated $29,000.00 remain-
ing at the end of the year 1962 (Ex. 1). 
Appellants' brief emphasizes twice in capital letters 
the net income from operations shown on page 4 of Ex-
hibit 3. Actually, this item is of little significance when 
it is considered that the question before the District in 
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August, 1961 was the amount necessary to be raised by 
taxation to carry on the operations of the District. In the 
first place, the Exhibit speaks as of the end of the year 
1960, and does not purport to show anything with respect 
to the financial condition existing at the time the tax was 
levied. Furthermore, the net income shown on page 4 
is simply the difference between the income derived from 
water sales, aqueduct rentals and water treatment, and 
the cost of operating the actual physical properties of the 
District. It does not purport to show the large amounts 
expended by the District during the year for capital im-
provements to its properties. A list of these expenditures 
will be found on page 18 of Exhibit 3. They amount to 
approximately $850,000. Neither does it take into account 
the stock assessments paid amounting to $277,650, nor the 
item $310,000 paid to the Bureau of Reclamation. Fi-
nally, it does not include payments made on the bonded 
indebtedness of the District amounting to $295,500, nor 
other items totaling more than $36,000. 
Actually, Exhibit 3 discloses that the revenue or 
income of the District for 1960, including the 2% mill tax 
of more than $600,000 was not sufficient to pay the cost of 
carrying on the business of the District. Even if the Di-
rectors of the District had no other facts before them 
than those disclosed in Exhibit 3, they would have been 
fully justified in determining as they did that it was nec-
essary to levy the 2¥2 mill tax in August, 1961 in order 
to carry on the functions of the District. 
The only question with which we are now concerned 
is whether the Board was justified in determining that 
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it was necessary to levy the tax in August, 1961 in order 
to carry on the business of the District .. The Appellants 
made no attempt to present any evidence to impeach the 
Board's determination of the necessity of levying the 
1961 case. The evidence is clear that if the Board had 
not levied the 1961 tax, it would have been compelled 
to practically exhaust its reserve funds and also curtail 
its functions to the detriment of the inhabitants of the 
City. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TAX LEVIED BY THE DISTRICT IN 
AUGUST 1961 WAS AND IS A VALID TAX. 
The only question involved in this case having any 
semblance of plausibility is whether the power of the 
Board of Directors of the District to levy the 1961 tax 
was affected by reason of the fact that the District had 
accumulated a fund for the purpose of meeting emergen-
cies likely or certain to arise. Appellants do not main-
tain that the tax was invalid because of the emergency 
funds of the District. They skirt that proposition by 
some objections to the tax which are so obscure and con-
fusing as to obliterate each other. 
Under Point I, Appellants state that "the basic 
question involved is whether or not the City is entitled to 
have payments for purchases of water from the District 
applied to the reduction of taxes which would otherwise be 
levied against the inhabitants or the City.'' Unless Appel-
lants mean to inquire whether the District is required to 
carry on its operations solely out of funds derived from 
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the sale of water to the City, then the "basic question" 
is a mere jumble of words. The statute expressly con-
fers on the District authority to levy the tax to meet the 
expenses of its operations, and obviously the income 
which the District receives from the sale of water must 
be used for the same purpose. What is accomplished by 
requiring the District to use one source of income to neu-
tralize another in whole or in part~ The ''crucial section'' 
of the Act which is said to bring about this absurdity is 
73-8-43. This section does not even mention the subject of 
payments for water sold and delivered. On the contrary, 
it deals with voluntary payments which it permits the 
City to make to the District but which the City is under 
no obligation to make. These permissive payments can be 
made out of funds not appropriated to any municipal 
purpose or which have been derived by the City from 
sales by it of water. If and when such voluntary pay-
ments are made by the City, the Section directs they must 
be treated by the District as payments in advance for 
water to be delivered to the City in the future or to avoid 
taxes which would otherwise have to be levied against 
the property in the District. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that the City has 
never had any funds which have not been appropriated 
to any municipal purpose and which it could use to pay 
in advance for water to be furnished by the District in the 
future. Invariably, the City has to borrow money in an-
ticipation of taxes in order to carry on its functions. It has 
not at any time ever made any voluntary payments to 
the District out of unappropriated funds or otherwise. 
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Although the City does resell at a profit water which 
it acquires from the District, it has never turned over 
any of these profits or proceeds of sale to the District. 
It is, therefore, idle to consider Section 73-8-43. It has 
no application whatever to payments made by the City 
to the District in satisfaction of a debt for ''goods sold 
and delivered.'' 
It is extremely significant that for more than twenty-
five years the City has made very substantial payments 
for water each year without ever having so much as inti-
mated to the District that the payments should be cred-
ited to any account or applied to any purpose other than 
the satisfaction of the City's indebtedness. 
Under Point II, Appellant says that the District has 
no power to levy the 21j2 mill tax for the purpose of creat.,. 
ing a surplus for future operating expenses or to acquire 
water rights in the future, but that such tax was intended 
solely for administering the District and operating its 
properties during 1961. Such a proposition is unsup-
ported by anything in the Metropolitan Water District 
Act. The 1961 tax was levied to raise revenue to meet 
the expenses of the District and not for creating a sur-
plus for any purpose. The emergency fund was already 
in existence and was not augmented in any way by the 
1961 tax. As a matter of fact, no part of any prior 21;2 
mill tax ever went into this fund. It was built up solely 
from profit derived from the sale of water other than 
water which ultimately reached the consumer within the 
City. The water sold by the District to the City for dis-
tribution to the inhabitants was sold at less than cost to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
the District. The District sells substantial amounts of 
water to private industry and also transports water for 
municipalities and others. These sales and services pro-
duce considerable revenue. It also sells water to Salt Lake 
City which the latter resells at a large profit to consum-
ers outside the City. It is from these sources of revenue 
that the District has built up the reserve fund under 
consideration. 
Appellant's contention that the District cannot use 
any of the 21;2 mill tax revenue in furtherance of projects 
to acquire water rights, but must submit all such projects 
to a vote of the inhabitants of the City would be a grievous 
misfortune to the taxpayer, if it were true. Obviously, 
the statute requires the District to obtain the approval 
of voters to such projects only as are to be financed 
through the issuance of bonds to be paid out of a special 
levy of taxes for that purpose. It is a tribute to the 
efficiency of the District that it is able to finance impor-
tant projects such as the $8,000,000 water treatment plant 
without levying any special tax therefor. A moment's re-
flection by the individual plaintiff should convince him 
that the contention .of the City Attorney on this point is 
a definite dis-service to him as a taxpayer. 
The last point asserted by the Appellants is that the 
District must use the 1961 tax revenue solely for the pur-
pose of discharging expenses of its operations during 
tha:t year. If this is the correct meaning of the statute, 
the District would soon be compelled to cease its opera-
tions. The 1961 tax would not be past due until Decem-
ber 1. By the time any substantial amount is received 
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by the County and turned over to the District, the year 
1961 is past and gone. Operating expenses whether those 
of a public or private corporation must be paid as they 
are incurred. If such expenses are deferred or ignored, 
the operator is automatically out of business. 
Appellants' interpretation of the statute is highly 
strained and unrealistic to say the least. Section 73-8-36 
directs only that before the 20th of August the Board of 
Directors shall determine the amount of money neces-
sary to be raised by taxation during the fiscal year begin-
ning the first day of January next preceding, to meet in-
terest and sinking fund requirements on bonded indebted-
ness and ''for all other District purposes.'' Now here in 
the statute is there any requirement· that a tax levied 
in any one year can be levied solely to meet expenses of 
operations during that year. All that it specifies is that 
the Board determine the amount of money necessary to 
be raised by taxation during that year for interest, sink-
ing fund and ''all District purposes.'' 
Admittedly, this Section is rather involved and con-
fusing, but it manifestly was not intended to require the 
District to carry on its operations by tax anticipation 
borrowing, or go out of business. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO JUSTICIABLE CONTRO-
VERSY BETWEEN THE DISTRICT AND 
THE CITY AND ITS APPEAL SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED. 
The individual plaintiff alleged that he owned prop-
erty in the City, that the District levied the tax against 
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his property, and that the tax was invalid. He further 
alleged that he had paid this tax under protest and was 
entitled to recover it from the County which had col-
lected it for the District. He sought a money judgment 
against the County and a declaratory judgment against 
the District. 
The City joined in the allegations with respect to 
the invalidity of the tax. It did not claim that the District 
or the County had attempted to collect the tax from it 
or that any of its property had been assessed. It sought 
only a declaratory judgment. 
Inasmuch as this misjoinder of plaintiffs is only a 
procedural error, it will not be dwelt upon. An orderly 
presentation of Respondent's case on appeal does, how-
ever, require us to separate these strange bedfellows. 
The City asserts that the tax is invalid because the 
District had on hand when the levy was made funds 
which the City Attorney characterizes as a surplus. It 
also alleged that the District could not levy taxes in one 
fiscal year for operational expenses of subsequent fiscal 
years. Its allegations that Section 73-8-43 requires the 
District to credit against the tax the purchase price of 
water received from the City for water sold and delivered 
has already been shown to be a mere wild pitch. 
We submit that the City has no legal capacity to 
question the validity of the tax and that there is not and 
cannot be any basis whatever for a controversy between. 
it and the District which a court would have jurisdic-
tion to determine. 
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The tax which we are now considering is an ad 
valorem tnx. It creates a lien on real property and can 
be collected only from that source. Neither the City nor 
the property owner is personally liable for the tax. The 
only parties affected by the tax and who have any stand-
ing in court to question its validity are the owners of the 
property upon which the tax is levied. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides, so far as 
the present case is concerned, that any person whose 
rights, status or other legal relationships are affected by 
a statute may have determined any question of construc-
tion or validity arising under the statute and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relationships 
thereunder (Sec. 78-33-2, U. C. A. 1953). 
A cursory examination of this Act reveals that it 
does not create any substantive rights. It is purely re-
medial in character. 
'' ... The declaratory judgment procedure is 
strictly remedial. The section does not create sub-
stantive rights or duties, but merely affords a 
new, additional, and cumulative procedural meth-
od for their judicial determination. . . . '' State 
Farm Mutual .Automobile Ins. Co. v. Morris, 173 
N .E. 2d 590, 594. 
In Sinclair Refining Compamy v. Bu.rrows, 133 F. 2d 
536, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals said of the 
Federal Act which does not differ materially from the 
Utah Act: 
'' ... The declaratory judgment act, 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 400, created no new substantive rights. It is 
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14 
procedural in nature, designed to expedite the es-
tablishment of rights between parties when an 
actual justiciable controversy exists between them 
as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract 
question or controversy. The declaratory judg-
ment must establish rights and declare liabilities 
which as a result thereof may be enforced by the 
prevailing party against the loser in a subsequent 
action.'' 
Since the Act is remedial, the party invoking it must 
have some right or interest in the subject matter which 
will in the future need protection. If the right or interest 
has already been invaded a coersive remedy is available 
and there is no basis to maintain any action for declara:.. 
tory relief. Furthermore, the rights or interests of the 
plaintiff must be adverse to those of the defendant. There 
must be a real controversy as distinguished from a hypo-
thetical dispute or a mere difference of opinion as to the 
law. In State v. Darmma!J1JJib, 220 Wis. 17, 264 N.W. 627, 
103 A.L.R. 1089, these requirements are thus sum-
marized: 
"(1) There must exist a justiciable controversy; 
that is to say, a controversy in which a claim of 
right is asserted against one who has an interest 
in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be be-
tween persons whose interests are adverse; (3) 
the party seeking declaratory relief must have a 
legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a 
legally protectible interest; and ( 4) the issue in-
volved in the controversy must be ripe for judi-
cial determination.'' 
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Professor Borchard in his treatise on Declaratory 
Judgments says: 
"It has already been observed that an action for 
a declaratory judgment must exhibit all the usual 
conditions of an ordinary action, except that 
accomplished physical injury need not necessarily 
be alleged. It is sufficient if a dispute or contro-
versy as to legal rights is shown, which, in the 
court's opinion, requires judicial determination 
- that is, in which the court is convinced that by 
adjudication a useful purpose will be served. The 
requisites of justiciability must be present. Not 
only must the plaintiff prove his tangible interest 
in obtaining a judgment, but the action must be 
adversary in character, that is, there must be a 
controversy between the plaintiff and a defendant, 
subject to the court's jurisdiction, having an in-
terest in opposing his claim. Unless the parties 
have such conflicting interests, the case is likely to 
be characterized as one for an advisory opinion, 
and the controversy as academic, a mere differ-
ence of opinion or disagreement not involving 
their legal relations, and hence not justiciable.'' 
This Court is already committed to these proposi-
tions. See Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 2d 251. 
Millard County v. Millard County, etc., 86 Utah 475, 46 
P. 2d 423. 
The case made by the City fails completely to present 
any of these necessary elements of a controversy which 
a court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate. It has no 
rights or interests that now need or ever will need pro-
tection or adjudication. It is not affected by the tax and 
is in no way concerned with its enforcement. It has no 
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property upon which the tax could be levied or assessed. 
It is neither an inhabitant of the District nor a taxpayer 
of any kind. It does not and could not have any legal 
controversy with the District with respect to the statute 
under which the District levied the tax and is without 
legal capacity to maintain any proceeding against the 
District. Its appearance in this action is totally 
unwarranted. 
In Boeing Airpl(J/YI;e Compa;ny v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 164 Kan. 149, 188 P. 2d 429, 11 A.L.R. 2d 
350, the Defense Plant Corporation leased a parcel of 
land to Boeing Airplane Company. The lease provided 
that the Lessee should pay all taxes lawfully imposed 
upon the property. The Defense Plant Corporation trans-
ferred the leased premises to the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation subject to the lease. The Lessee then 
brought suit against the Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration and the County Officials to obtain a judgment de-
claring that it was not liable for the taxes. The court held 
that there was no justiciable controversy between the 
plaintiff and the County Officials for the reason that 
the taxes were assessed against the land which the plain-
tiff did not own. It dismissed the appeal on the ground 
that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of 
the action. The court said : 
'' ... No actual controversy can exist in this case 
between the company, which is the lessee of the 
land, and the county officials. Such officials can 
look only to the land and therefore can have a con-
troversy in this case only with the owners of the 
land. The company has only an option to purchase 
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the real estate, may never exercise it and there-
fore never own it. It follows that there may never 
develop an actual controversy between the com-
pany and the taxing officials. There must be two 
sides to any actual controversy. In this case the 
county officials cannot have an actual controversy 
with the company because such officials cannot 
contend that any obligation of any kind or char-
acter exists as between them and the com-
pany .... '' 
In Day v. Board of Regents, etc., 36 P. 2d 262, the 
plaintiff ''a resident, voter, elector and taxpayer'' 
brought an action to have the Basic Science Law of Ari-
zona declared invalid. This law required all those who 
practice the art of healing for hire to pass an examina-
tion on certain scientific subjects, and to pay a license 
fee. The complaint did not disclose that the plaintiff 
had ever practiced or that he ever intended to prac-
tice the art of healing for hire, and the court dismissed 
the action upon the ground "It is the undisputed rule 
that only those who are affected in some manner by a 
statute may question its constitutionality.'' The Ari-
zona statute relating to declaratory judgments is vir-
tually identical to our own. 
Thomas v. Riggs, 175 P. 2d 404, was another action 
seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Ida-
ho Coin Operated Amusement Device Control Act was un-
constitutional and in conflict with the anti-gambling 
statutes. Plaintiff described himself as a citizen and 
taxpayer of the State of Idaho, and like many others 
similarly situated opposed to the violation of the anti-
gambling statutes. The court held that he lacked capacity 
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to sue because he did not and could not assert any rights 
or interests which were endangered or affected by the 
Control Act. It said: 
" ... Appellant, in the case at bar, did not allege 
what legal right he enjoyed, if any, as either a citi-
zen or taxpayer, was 'threatened or endangered.' 
He alleged simply he was a citizen and taxpayer, 
that he was opposed to gambling, and that the en-
forcement of the anti-gambling statute against 
licensed slot machine operators was 'a matter of 
grave public concern and moment.' But, again, ap-
pellant did not allege in what respect, if any, the 
alleged failure to enforce the anti-gambling stat-
utes, against licensed slot machine operators,_ 
'threatened or endangered' any personal, legal, 
right he possessed.'' 
Since the City presented no justiciable controversy 
and did not seek nor was entitled to any coercive relief, 
the District Court lacked jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of the action so far as the City was concerned. 
It necessarily follows that this Court likewise has no 
jurisdiction of the City's appeal except to dismiss it. 
POINT III. 
DECLARATORY RELIEF IS DENIED 
WHERE AN ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY 
EXISTS OR WHERE BASED UPON CON-
TINGENT EVENTS. 
The individual plaintiff seeks a declaratory judg-
ment to the effect that the District has no power to 
levy the 1961 tax because the District had on hand what 
he designates as a surplus. He also asks the Court to 
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adjudicate that the District has no right to levy taxes 
in one fiscal year for the purpose of carrying on opera-
tions in a subsequent fiscal year. 
The tax assailed by the plaintiff has been levied, 
assessed, and paid. Plaintiff paid the tax under protest 
and seeks in this action to recover it from the County. 
If, for any reason, the tax is invalid, the plaintiff's 
remedy at law is complete and adequate, and there is 
no occasion for him to seek the extraordinary remedy 
of declaratory relief. 
It may be conceded that declaratory relief may he 
granted notwithstanding the existence of a legal or 
equitable remedy. However, if the legal or equitable 
remedy is adequate, declaratory relief is superfluous 
and will be denied. The Declaratory Judgment Act 
creates a new remedy and was not intended to replace 
or modify existing remedies. To this effect are numer-
ous authorities, some of which are cited below. 
An even more cogent reason for denying the plain-
tiff a declaratory judgment is that it would be based 
upon events that may never occur. It is by no means 
certain that the district will at any future date have on 
hand the so-called surplus funds. On the contrary it is 
highly probable that the alleged surplus will be ex-
hausted in carrying out the projects to obtain new 
supplies of water and to meet emergencies which are 
almost certain to arise. Neither is it absolutely certain 
that the district will in the future levy a tax in one 
year to cover expenses of operation of a subsequent 
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year. The 21;2 mill limited tax is not a permanent tax 
imposed by statute. It is assessed by the Directors of 
the District after they have determined the amount of 
money needed to carry on the operations of the District. 
Both the amount of and the necessity for the tax are 
matters contingent upon future events. The uncertainty 
of their actual occurrence as well as the likelihood of 
the so-called surplus being spent makes it legally im-
possible to render a valid declaratory judgment. Such 
a judgment would constitute a mere legal opinion and 
not a final or effective determination of any justiciable 
controversy. 
The principle is thus stated in Miller v. Stolinski, 
32 N.W. 2d 199, 149 Nebr. 679: 
''The Declaratory Judgments Act is applicable 
only where there is a present actual controversy 
and all interested persons are made parties, and 
only where justiciable issues are presented. It 
does not undertake to decide the legal effect of 
laws upon a state of facts which is future, contin-
gent, or uncertain .... " 
See also Wolverine etc. v. Clark, 270, N.W. 167, 277 
Mich. 633; Heller v. Shapiro, 242 N.W. 174, 208 Wis. 
310; · West v. Wichita, 234 Pac. 978, 118 Kan. 265. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2lj2 mill tax levied by the District in August, 
1961, for the purpose of raising revenue to carry on 
the operations of the District was and is a valid and 
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subsisting tax, and created a lien upon the taxable 
property within the territorial limits of the District. 
The power to levy this tax is expressly conferred upon 
the District by the Metropolitan Water District Act. 
This power is not qualified, limited or in any manner 
affected by the fact that the District had accumulated 
out of profits from its operation a fund for the purpose 
of acquiring additional sources of supplies of water 
without resorting to special taxation, and to meet emer-
gencies which are certain to arise during periods of 
drouth. The Act contains no provision preventing the 
District from creating this fund or using it in the manner 
which the Board of Directors is using and proposes to 
use it. The creation, management and disposition of 
this fund is a function of the District not subject to 
supervision or control by the courts. 
The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City 
1s a public corporation, created for the purpose of 
obtaining additional supplies of water for the benefit 
primarily of the inhabitants of the District. It is com-
pletely independent of the City or any other municipal 
corporation. "Each such District when so incorporated 
shall be a separate and independent political corporate 
entity." (Sec. 73-8-3) Neither the City nor any of its 
officials has any power or authority whatsoever to 
supervise, manage, control or direct any of the powers 
or functions of the District or its Board of Directors. 
The only relationship between the District and the City 
is that of buyer and seller of water (Sec. 73-8-18, Sub-
paragraph 1, and Section 73-8-31). The city is in no 
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manner affected by or concerned with the tax involved 
in this action. It has no rights or interests under the 
Metropolitan Water District Act that have been invaded 
or threatened with invasion by the District. Its interests 
are neither adverse nor hostile to those of the District. 
It has no dispute with the District that rises to the 
dignity of a justiciable controversy and is without legal 
capacity to maintain the action. Its appeal from the 
judgment to that effect is frivolous and should be dis-
missed. 
The case for the individual plaintiff is equally with-
out foundation in law or in fact, although admittedly 
he has legal capacity to sue for recovery of the tax 
paid under protest. He has neither alleged nor proved 
any facts which impair the validity of the tax. He is 
not entitled to any declaratory relief because he does 
not question the power of the District to levy the tax 
in the future except under circumstances which may 
never occur. The judgment rendered against him is 
correct and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Grant H. Bagley, for 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
FISHER HARRIS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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